Unraveling the law of war
Stephen Ellmann* Ten years ago, in Hamdi, 1 Justice O' Connor wrote that the Court's understanding of the law of war might "unravel." "Unraveling," it turns out, is not precisely the right word. But the thesis of this chapter is that the law of war has indeed -already -substantially evolved as it has encountered the war, or conflict, with terrorism. In this clash of ideologies and arms, the United States and other nations confront an adversary different in many respects from the uniformed soldiers who were the enemy in past wars. It is possible to argue that these differences are so important that in fact we are simply not in war or armed conflict, but I will reject that argument, and will argue instead that our understanding of what armed conflict is should adapt to the character of the use of force today. At the same time, I will maintain that it is impossible to ignore the differences between past and present conflicts, and that the process of fighting justly in wars of this new character calls on courts to play roles much broader than they may historically have played in the United States (US). In short, I will argue that the constitutional war power of the US now extends to conflicts substantially different from many of the wars we have recognized in the past, and that the constitutional authority of courts in these conflicts is and should also now be substantially different.
This chapter is an attempt to work out the implications of one fundamental intuition -that much of the reason that many observers have resisted calling the struggle against terrorism a war is that they fear the war paradigm will undercut the human rights of those caught up within it. There is a great deal of justification for that fear, but the best way to respond to it is not by denying that the ferocious acts of terrorists are part * My thanks to the organizers and the other participants in the conference of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Research Group on Constitutional Responses to Terrorism, on "Constitutionalism Across Borders in the Struggle Against Terrorism" and as always to Teresa Delcorso-Ellmann. of an armed conflict. Rather, the best way to protect the rights that this conflict may jeopardize is to address, head-on, the question of what rights the law of this new kind of war must protect. In sketching this argument, I will speak quickly about many topics that undoubtedly each deserve more extensive treatment, but I hope that this short statement of my argument will demonstrate the potential of the approach I am advocating.
I. THE RESHAPING OF ARMED CONFLICT
There have been a great many conflicts involving arms, and by no means all of them have involved uniformed combatants arrayed on the two sides. Nevertheless the classic modern conception of war, the conception that pervaded first the Hague Conventions and then the Geneva Conventions, was of a clash of armies like these. As others have observed, in wars of this sort, when combatants are targeted or captured there are few questions of whether or not they are in fact combatants. 2 Though not every fighter is properly in uniform, most are, and no elaborate or sophisticated factfinding apparatus is needed to read their insignia. Nor do such combatants shrink from being identified as such after capture, because ordinarily their uniforms are sufficient to demonstrate their entitlement to prisoner of war (POW) status, and that status is noncriminal and nonpunitive (so long as the terms of the Third Geneva Convention are observed). Moreover, although no one knows when a war begins what the date of its completion will be, twentieth century wars between states did in fact have endings, and (compared to the war against terrorism) quite rapid ones.
Once the domain of armed conflicts expands to include terrorists, the legal issues surrounding detention (and targeting) all become much more fraught. Questions of jdentification abound, for terrorists rarely wear uniforms, and the dividing line between civilians and fighters is far from clear-cut. Terrorists also by no means welcome identification as fighters. If they are so identified, they do not become entitled to the protections of POWs, because their own fighting tactics -including deliberate attacks 2 The difference is not absolute: "even in state-versus-state warfare the enemy soldier identification problem is not eliminated." Matthew C. Waxman,
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected
Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 REV. , 1382 REV. (2008 . Waxman discusses both the identification problem and the high stakes resulting from the prospect of unending detention, an issue I take up in the text below. on civilians and the obvious lack of uniforms -disqualify them from POW status. (Al Qaeda fighters do, to be sure, still benefit from the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, now that it has been established -in US Law, at any rate 3 -that the conflict between the US and Al Qaeda is at least a non-international armed conflict.) In addition, they cannot count on release at any time soon, or indeed ever. If the basic rule of combatant detention in international armed conflicts, namely that combatants can be held until the end of hostilities, applies to the kinds of hostilities in which terrorists and the US engage, it is quite possible to argue that these hostilities will continue longer than the lifetimes of all those in detention.
Moreover, it is quite clear that the events of terrorist attacks overlap with the domain of criminal law in a way that traditional military activities do not. We do not intuitively speak of the movements of army divisions as crimes, but we have a long history of prosecuting politicallymotivated acts of terror under the criminal law. It can be argued that what we confront is an insidious and widespread -indeed, transnationalcriminal conspiracy, rather than a military force.
One might respond to all this by saying that the conflicts between the US and terrorists are not, in fact, armed conflicts -except, that is, when these conflicts actually take the form of clashes of armies, as in Afghanistan. If that is so, then international humanitarian law or the law of war does not apply to them. Arguably those engaged in terrorism could only be detained after criminal conviction, although the exact dimensions of either US constitutional law on preventive detention of terrorists or the international human rights law on the same subject are not entirely certain. 4 Assuming, however, that detention would only be possible on the basis of criminal law procedures, problems of identification would be resolved by application of the beyond a reasonable doubt rule (not a perfect rule, as evidence of wrongful convictions attests, but as good as we have got). Problems of unregulated and abusive treatment in detention would be resolved by the Eighth Amendment, at least for prisoners inside the US, and by the regimes of criminal punishment in general. Problems of indefinite detention would be resolved as well, at least as long as criminal sentences provided for a term of years. Even sentences that were indefinite in duration would at least be imposed by a duly constituted authority other than the detaining forces.
But this solution is not satisfactory, for two related reasons. First, it misses the reality of the kinds of clashes we now must deal with. Clearly, at least some conflicts with terrorism attain a level of ferocity and intensity that qualifies them as armed conflicts. 5 The US war with the Taliban, when the Taliban were the effective government of Afghanistan, was such a conflict -a classic, interstate conflict. 6 When the Taliban were toppled from power and became an insurgency against the new government of Afghanistan, the war continued, now probably best characterized as a non-international armed conflict. 7 At the very least, Al Qaeda, when it joined in the Taliban's war effort, became a participant in these conflicts -though I will argue that Al Qaeda was in fact party to an armed conflict in its own right as well. Moreover, in this war it seems clear that some people who are members of no army are nevertheless people carrying out a "continuous combat function," who deserve (as the ICRC study maintains 8 ) to be viewed not as civilianssubject to military targeting only while engaged in combat -but as fighters who are subject to targeting at all times. If only for this subset of conflicts with terrorists, we must confront the problems of potentially wrongful and indefinite detention that this kind of adversary presents.
But the point extends to events that involve far fewer attackers than the extensive fighting in Afghanistan features . It is generally acknowledged that Al Qaeda's terrorist strikes on 9/11 amounted to an "armed attack" against the US , triggering a right of self-defense.9 But those strikes were carried out by 19 men. Those men were hardly an army, but they were fighters, engaged -I would say -in a continuous combat function, over the months that were required for them to make their way to the airplanes they would commandeer. If we do not say that, then we have to describe these men as having been, over those months, civilians engaged only in planning for a crime, while we simultaneously declare that the result of their prolonged efforts suddenly transformed itself into a military event. This abrupt transition from crime to warfare is too metaphysical; those who are directly engaged in the many steps needed to execute a terrorist armed attack are, I would say, engaged in hostilities throughout.
To the same effect, we can rightly say that we had a right of self-defense against them at every point in their progress. This view appears to be held by the Obama Administration. Kenneth Anderson and Benjamin Wittes read Obama Administration statements as "most plausibly" arguing "that targeting is lawful against a threat that is continuing on the part of some actor, and could result in an attack at any particular in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks .... Of course, whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses. 11
As horrendously successful as the 9/11 terrorist attacks were, moreover, they were not unique. It is a feature of our world today that acts of terrorism can impose stunning loss of life. That matters: when people commit slaughters, other people fight back; such events are the stuff of war. As Gabriella Blum has written, "technology and globalization have made individuals (or groups of individuals) capable of inflicting harm in a magnitude previously reserved for large organized armed forces." 12 David Kennedy has observed: violence has become a tactic for all sorts of players -warlords and drug lords and freelance terrorists and insurgents and religious fanatics and national liberation armies and more. States have lost the monopoly on metaphoric, as well as actual warfare. War is now the continuation of a far more chaotic politics, in a far more chaotic political environment. Terrorism, to be sure, is not new, and the US had anarchist bombings a century ago. But just as the internet has made everyone a potential publisher, so technology has made a lot of people soldiers. The men who attacked Charlie Hebdo, dressed in black, heavily armed, and executing those they regarded as their enemies, clearly conceived of themselves as warriors, and the harm they did confirms their judgment.
In short, if we measure the proper scope of military authority by the degree of peril presented, we should acknowledge that in today's world it is possible for terrorists, even those not gathered on some field of conventional battle, to be participants in armed conflict. This remains true even if the terrorists are no longer truly gathered together under some traditional hierarchy -as may well be the case today, with the gradual diminution and fragmentation of Al Qaeda. 14 Networking is the theme of our world, and networked violence with modern weaponry can be armed attack. 1 5
Second, while it is true that terrorist "soldiers" are very likely also criminals, it must be acknowledged that sometimes these criminals will not be convictable. Exactly this problem plagues us today at Guantanamo, though for these detainees a significant part of our law enforcement problem is that we abused and even tortured them during interrogation, with the result that what may be ample evidence of their criminal guilt is inadmissible and useless in courts that can claim any degree of constitutional or international legitimacy. But the problem is broader than that. Sometimes terrorists cannot be captured, and so cannot be brought to justice. Sometimes the evidence of their guilt may be lost because the people who first come on the "crime scenes" will be soldiers in battle, who will not be in a position to conduct extensive criminal forensic examinations. Sometimes, as well, the evidence of guilt may come from sources that are entirely undisclosable -not because they are unlawful but because they are truly, and necessarily, secret. Current law requires at least two elements to show the existence of a non-international armed conflict:
. (i) the parties involved must demonstrate a certain level of organization, and
(ii) the violence must reach a certain level of intensity. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 8. My argument is, essentially, that the first of these criteria ought to be read with great flexibility, given the stunning degree to which the second criterion -the intensity of violence -can now be met by very modestly organized actors.
It is quite true that many convictions of terrorism have been won in the civilian federal courts, and I am not at all arguing against such prosecutions when they are feasible. 16 But where they are not, if the only paradigm within which we can lawfully proceed is the criminal justice system, we may have no way to proceed at all. That's true for any crime, of course, and we accept it as part of a just Jaw enforcement system. The harms that terrorists can inflict can burst the bounds of what we normally encounter in criminal law, however, and it is hard to accept that they might do so without lawful consequence. It is precisely to prevent harms of such magnitude that the Geneva Conventions permit the parties to international armed conflicts to detain each other's soldiers until the end of the hostilities. Otherwise the soldiers will return to the battlefield.
None of this is an argument for the casual use of military force. Had we realized who the 9/11 attackers were in advance, we surely would not have bombed them as they moved about American cities, any more than we bombed the German saboteurs who slipped into the US in World War II and were arrested and tried in the case that became Ex parte Quirin.
17
But that would have been because no such steps were needed. The reason would not have been that they were civilians, entitled to be acted against only in a law enforcement paradigm. It might well be appropriate to impose special restrictions, as a matter of policy or of law, on the use of military force against targets who are not in a '"hot' conflict zone" -like the 9/11 attackers in the pre-attack period. Jennifer Daskal has cogently argued for such legal limits. 1 s But Daskal's approach "assumes that the conflict extends to wherever the enemy threat is found ," 1 9 and this assumption makes sense. Id. at 1172.
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But see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OP THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 22. The ICRC argues here that one reason to reject this view is "the consequence that would be borne by civilians or civilian objects in the non-belligerent states." Id. That is of course an important concern, but legal limits on the use of force outside hot conflict zones in principle could address it. The ICRC also refers to
II. THE EXPANSION OF RIGHTS
What then is to be done? The conflicts in which we are now embroiled present grave risks to those we may wrongly target for killing, and to those whom we do not kiU but instead capture and detain. I will focus first, and most extensively, on how the law of war should regulate detention; when we have traced the ways that a rights-minded law of war can address detention, we will turn briefly to the issues involved in targeting. 2 1 Let us start, however, with detention: if the conflicts we are now part of will inevitably produce numbers of captives whose actual status as fighters is somewhat open to doubt, and who face potentially lifelong captivity now that we hold them, then we need a way to protect against wreaking such harm wrongly. This is, in fact, what we have already evolved.
(1) The availability of habeas for military detainees: Boumediene is, of course, a decision that the writ of habeas corpus applies to military detainees. 22 I would not assume that POWs from some uniformed army in a future war would enjoy the same right, though it is certainly possible that they would. (As far as I am aware, no foreign soldiers held in POW camps in the US during World War II petitioned for habeas corpus, and "possible ius ad bellum issues that this scenario would raise," id., but it is no part of my proposal to commit unlawful violations of non-belligerent states' sovereignty in the process of pursuing terrorists. More generally, the ICRC argues that "with the exception of the few specific acts of terrorism that may take place in armed conflict, it is submitted that the term 'act of terrorism' should be reserved for acts of violence committed outside of armed conflict." Id. at 51. But the force of this point of terminology seems diminished by the number of terrorist acts that are in fact prohibited by international humanitarian law, given that (as the ICRC itself shows, id. at 49) both treaty law and quite possibly customary law prohibit "[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population."
21 My argument for a "rights-minded law of war" does not rest on a resolution of the questions of when and to what extent international human rights principles apply in situations of armed conflict, but rather contends that the law of war itself should become rights-minded. For a reading of international human rights provisions as generally applicable during war, see Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights on the Battlefield, 47 G EO. WASH. lNT'L L. REV. 509 (2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2563329; for an account placing more emphasis on the "lex specialis" of the law of war, see INTER-NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 13-20. 22 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
surely there is less need for such a protection for uniformed troops. But as long as membership in a uniformed enemy army is a sufficient basis for detention there also would be little cost to the availability of habeas for POWs except in rote issuance of denials of the writ if they did have the right to seek it.) 23 But Boumediene makes clear that prisoners from the non-uniformed forces that we have been fighting, who are now held at Guantanamo, are entitled to the protections of the Suspension Clause. Otherwise the risk of erroneous detention, and more broadly the risk of arbitrary executive/military power, is too great. 24 Here, unmistakably, one aspect of the law of war in the US -the separation of military detention authority from judicial oversight -has already "unraveled." 25 (2) The courts' role in determining where hostilities are taking place: Boumediene and other cases also reflect that another feature of the law of war has, almost unconsciously, come within judicial cognizance. This, as Laurie Blank has shown, is the question of where hostilities are taking place. 26 Part of the rationale for Boumediene is that our control over Guantanamo is so complete and unchallenged that the perils of war provide no basis for withholding the protection of habeas corpus there. 27 To say that is to say -as indeed the Supreme Court was prepared to say 23 The ICRC observes that "[i]t is generally uncontroversial that the detaining state is not obliged to provide review, judicial or other, of the lawfulness of POW internment as long as active hostilities are ongoing, because enemy combatant status denotes that a person is ipso facto a security threat." INTER-NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 17. in the context of the Civil War, in Ex parte Milligan 28 -that the war is in one place, but not another.
( 3) Extending Boumediene to make habeas available, where feasible, even in areas of hostilities:
To my mind it is clear that an additional step should be taken, namely for courts to assess whether the perils of war do really prevent access to habeas corpus even when those perils are in fact present. This of course was the question while we held detainees in Afghanistan, and the D.C. Circuit has adamantly refused to accept the existence of a constitutional right to habeas corpus for those detainees because war is actually raging there. 29 There's no doubt that that reasoning has a basis in Boumediene, but the conclusion that the ongoing conflict against terrorism provides a reason to deny access to habeas in Afghanistan seems ill-founded. The risks of mistaken identification in Afghanistan were acute; the resentment fostered in the local population by detention was intense; and the surprising reality was that the US was clearly capable of elaborating a system of adjudication despite the presence of war. In fact, we generated two distinct systems of adjudication -a system of military review boards of our own, 30 and a system of actual criminal trials carried out by Afghan authorities in facilities inside the US-controlled Bagram base.3 1 If the reason for judicial involvement at Guantanamo is to prevent avoidable injustice, that reason was present in Afghanistan too, and so I would say that the fundamental point of Boumediene calls for reduced judicial deference to assertions of the necessities of war, not only at Guantanamo but also elsewhere.
(4) Judicial determination of when a war is over: Another issue also seems to call for judicial intervention -the question of when the war ends. 32 The Hamdi plurality says that the power to detain lasts as long as 28 the hostilities in question continue, but the hostilities that it points to are not the ongoing clashes of the war against terrorism around the world but the specific combat under way, then as now, in Afghanistan. But what happens when the hostilities in Afghanistan end, as presumably they someday will? The answer in current US law is in Ludecke, a case decided well after the :fighting ended in World War II that nonetheless declared that the President's wartime power to detain and expel enemy aliens lasted until the political branches declared the war was over. 3 3 Perhaps such a declaration will be issued just as the fighting in fact ends, but if it is not, it seems to me that courts must speak to the question of whether authority for detention still persists. This, again, is suggested by Boumediene, in which the Supreme Court said that although it was up to the Executive to say where US sovereignty formally extended, that authority did not displace the Court's duty to say where the Constitution ran.34
( 5) Judicial review of the conditions of detention for military detainees:
A further question may now be coming within judicial purview as a result of Boumediene: the question of the conditions under which terrorism detainees are held. Here too one might maintain that the soldiers of uniformed armies do not need the protections of the courts, because they already have the protections of POW status under the Geneva Conventions. But terrorist :fighters will not have that protection, and if anything is apparent from the past decade it is that Common Article 3 by itself will not assure detainees of protection against mistreatment. But, as it happens, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit has recently ruled that Boumediene, by (according to the D.C. Circuit) restoring the whole of statutory habeas protection to detainees, has also restored the little-noted (and controversial) authority of habeas courts to rule not only on issues of release but also on conditions of confinement. 35 That makes a lot of sense for detainees who are not otherwise well 33 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) . 34 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755 . I am happy to acknowledge that I learned about this issue while working with a student, Melissa Jangl, whose post on the implications of the possible end of fighting in Afghanistan can be found on "Detained by U.S.", a website maintained for several years by the students in my protected by law. It also makes sense in dealing with detainees whose rage against their captors is such that they are prepared to risk death by suicide, and to trigger painful forced feeding meant to keep them alivethe facts that provoked the DC Circuit litigation. When captor and captive are so profoundly at odds, courts are needed to hold the balance between them.
There is another reason why courts should have at least some role in overseeing the treatment of detainees: that the Constitution requires it. This of course is controversial. Two factors suggest, however, that we should acknowledge (indeed, embrace) the Constitution's application, at least in some respects besides the protection of the Suspension Clause, to enemy fighters held in detention.3 6 First, Boumediene did not arise from nothing. An important part of its basis was in the "Insular Cases" from the era of US colonialism, in which the Supreme Court reasoned that while some rights guaranteed by the Constitution did not extend beyond the borders of the states, others did. 37 Boumediene is an application of the proposition that the Constitution has some measure of force beyond our borders, and there is no reason in principle why that measure should end with the Suspension Clauseespecially since there is already some sign, in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez, that the Fourth Amendment in a proper case could reach beyond our borders. 3 8 36 Though the commands of the US Constitution are not directly part of the international Jaw of war, they nonetheless help shape the law of war as recognized in American law -since we cannot be party to law, whatever its source, that is unconstitutional. The law of war itself, in turn, is a Jaw of nations, including the US, and so in the end the requirements of our Constitution do indirectly affect the contours of international law. (For an instance of the shaping of US law in light of the "universal agreement and practice" of the international law of war, see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war."'). Here, in any event, the effect of reading the Constitution as I propose is to buttress US adherence to principles of detainee treatment already embodied in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
37 Boumediene describes these cases as holding "that the Constitution has independent force in these territories, a force not contingent upon acts of legislative grace," though limited by "inherent practical difficulties." 553 U.S. at 756-59. Second, obviously the most acute concern in conditions of confinement is torture. It is possible to maintain (at least one lower court has) that the Constitution does not prohibit the US from torturing noncitizens abroad. 39 I have trouble understanding how that proposition squares with the underlying constitutional idea (emphasized by Justice Stevens in Hamdan) of the "rule of law." 40 No case of the US Supreme Court has actually held that the Constitution permits us to torture foreigners abroad , and we ought not to accept that as the law. If it is not the Law, if the Constitution does prohibit at least some mistreatment of detainees abroad (not to mention at home), then courts should enforce that safeguard.
(6) Judicial review of the continued need for military detention: Similar logic suggests a further role for the courts. I assumed earlier that the hostilities in Afghanistan would someday end. Everything comes to an end eventually, but it is by no means clear that the hostilities between the US and the terrorist network inspired by Al Qaeda will come to an end in our -or the detainees ' -lifetimes. That means that detention under the law-of-war principle that the end of the hostilities marks the end of detention authority might be the equivalent of life imprisonment. It seems to me that the law of war, framed as it was for a world in which wars actually did end, should not lightly be understood to have this consequence. Perhaps one should say, as Jonathan Hafetz has thoughtfully argued, that in a war without end, some ongoing measure of the need for detention against its harm to the detainee should be undertaken. 41 Indeed, our military tribunals do attempt to assess present threat, so that just being eligible for detention as an enemy fighter is not, today, enough to found a detention decision. One might ask whether courts can assess threat; I do not think there's much reason to believe that courtspresented with the necessary information -will be any more fallible at this task than soldiers in military tribunals. Meanwhile, the risk of injustice in lifelong detention is so profound as to suggest the need for judicial intervention. Indeed, the prospect of such indefinite detention was part of what drove Boumediene.
(7) Judicial review of the executive's choice to exercise military detention authority: Here is one further possibility, perhaps a more complicated one than some of those I have discussed so far. As the early years of the Bush Administration's use of military detention made clear, the sheer fact that the government designated someone as an enemy combatant in and of itself drastically altered the rights that that person retained. A person held as an enemy combatant could validly be held that way on far less proof than a person held as a criminal defendant -and the designation was entirely up to the executive (a point brought home to me by a student in class discussion years ago). That prospect remains, and indeed seems inherent in a system in which many acts that (on my account) can be parts of armed attacks triggering military force are also crimes, not just war crimes but violations of the ordinary criminal code of the US. Should there be some power for courts to review the designation -not the adequacy of proof that someone fits the category into which he has been assigned, but the decision to assign the category in the first place? I am inclined to say that such a power should exist; one way to establish it might be to require a showing that criminal prosecution is actually infeasible, as Jennifer Daskal has urged. 42 (8) Judicial review of targeting: How much further should the law of war -in its separation (in the US) of executive use of force away from judicial oversight -unravel? Here we move from detention to targeting, and with that move we add what might seem a critical additional reason for judicial restraint: that courts should not interfere with the actual conduct of combat. Justice O'Connor in Hamdi noted that "[t]he parties agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process we have discussed here; that process is due only when the determination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized." 43 But as Robert Chesney has pointed out, some of the decisionmaking involved in targeting "is slow-paced enough ... to allow for a quasi-judicial process 42 Daskal, supra note 18, at 1217-18. 43 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
to unfold within the executive branch, with representatives of various agencies and departments reviewing the intelligence and debating its implications en route to multiple further stages of review" 44 -and if all this can happen, one might think that there is a role for courts as well. 45 Is this inconceivable as a general matter? Actually we know it is not. That is, we know that one nation, as embroiled in traditional and nontraditional conflict as we are, recognizes a much greater role for courts than we lately have. That state is Israel. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Israel on issues such as targeted killing and indefinite detention have received some attention. 4 6 But I am more struck by another case, in which the court was asked to intervene in the midst of battle -regular, traditional battle -in the Gaza strip. 47 The court heard the case. It professed no jurisdiction over the issues of military necessity underlying decisions to be made about how to fight the battle. But it insisted on its authority to regulate the humanitarian law protection of civilians during that battle. In fact , an officer of the Israeli army appeared in court to receive and implement the court's directions. There is no sign that the result was to deprive the Israeli military of its capacity to wage war.
It might be argued, in response, that to subject military decisionmaking to law will have the perverse result of diminishing the moral self-restraint that soldiers feel as they make the life-and-death decisions of their profession. 48 I do not deny that this outcome is conceivable. But at the same time I doubt that it is likely. The fear that law will rationalize rather 44 than restrain is analogous to the fear that law, deployed in unjust states as a tool to limit injustice, will wind up legitimizing the very injustice it challenges. South Africa was such a state, in which anti-apartheid activists and lawyers made extensive use of law. They worried about the risk of legitimation, but history allows us to say, with confidence, that anti-apartheid lawyering did not dampen the massive human struggle against that evil system. 49 When soldiers and citizens question the morality of acts of war, I do not think that court decisions holding those acts lawful will easily alleviate their concerns. The conduct of war, like the path of constitutionalism, is more than the decisions of courts. 50 
CONCLUSION
In the world we have arrived in, war is more diverse than we had expected and more present and frightening as well. We should not deny this. Nor should we shrink from applying military force, and military paradigms, if called for by the situation we face. But we should also address the risk -rightly emphasized by those who have urged that we adhere to a criminal rather than a war paradigm -that entering the world of military force will tear apart the protections of human rights. 51 It is not clear to me that adherence to a criminal paradigm will in fact preserve any understanding of rights that the threat of terrorism really challenges; as Chesney and Goldsmith have noted, different paradigms can and do converge. 52 The proper solution, it seems to me, is not to try to deny that 49 
